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Trust & evidence

Electronic Signature Process & Evidence

How Hereby captures an electronic signature, certifies it, and lets anyone check it afterward — written so a reviewer can compare the process against the resulting certificate, line by line.

Applicable law
U.S. ESIGN Act (15 U.S.C. § 7001 et seq.) and applicable state electronic-transactions laws (UETA)
Verify a document
herebysign.com/verify
Last updated
July 26, 2026

Every statement below is meant to correspond to something you can see on an actual signed certificate. Section numbers (§) are cross-referenced throughout; a sample certificate appears at the end.

§1What Hereby is

Hereby is an electronic-signature and evidence service designed to support transactions governed by the U.S. ESIGN Act and applicable state electronic-transactions laws. Every completed signing produces a Certificate of Electronic Signature that records the signer information submitted, the phone-possession verification performed, the version of the terms presented for acceptance and the result of the client-to-server hash comparison, and a tamper-evident fingerprint of the final document.

The service rests on three deliberate principles, each reflected on the certificate:

§2Legal basis

ESIGN and applicable state electronic-transactions laws generally provide that a signature or record may not be denied legal effect solely because it is electronic. Enforceability still depends on applicable law, consent, intent, attribution, record availability, and transaction-specific requirements. The certificate records evidence relevant to several of these considerations:

ConsiderationEvidence on the certificate
Intent to signThe applied signature (drawn or typed) plus the affirmed acceptance statement
Consent to transact electronically“Electronic signature consent — Agreed (ESIGN / UETA)”
Association with the recordSignature and record hash bound in the same certified PDF
Retention / reproducibilityThe completed PDF contains the agreement text and certificate page in a retainable, reproducible form; SHA-256 hashes help detect later changes

§3Signer verification (SMS one-time passcode)

The signer confirms possession of a specific mobile number by receiving and entering a one-time passcode. The certificate records the verified number in masked form (e.g., +1 (•••) •••-5554) and states the method and its limits verbatim:

“Possession of mobile number … confirmed by one-time passcode at signing. No government-issued ID was collected or verified.”

This states what was and was not established. Possession of a phone number is not, on its own, proof of legal identity, and the certificate does not represent it as government-ID proofing.

§4Disclosure integrity — evidence of what the signer was shown

This is the point most often weak in electronic signing, and the one most likely to be tested in a dispute: which words was the signer shown?

A “Verified” result confirms that the client-reported hash matched the canonical hash on file. It does not, by itself, prove that a human read or understood the terms.

§5Assent capture — recorded as observed, never fabricated

The interface records the interaction as it happens and reports only what was observed: when the terms were opened; that they were displayed to the end — distinguishing between the signer scrolling to the end of a long agreement and the full text fitting on screen with no scrolling required; and when the acceptance box was agreed. The Agree control stays disabled until the full text has been displayed. The terms-opened, displayed-to-end, and acceptance interaction timestamps are reported by the client and recorded as received; the signing-completion time (§6) is separately recorded by Hereby’s server. Hereby never invents or auto-completes an interaction event.

§6The Certificate of Electronic Signature — field by field

Every completed record carries a certificate page. Each line states one fact:

FieldWhat it records
Electronic signerName · title · business submitted for the person who signed
Electronic signature consentESIGN/UETA consent, recorded
Agreement assentThe acceptance statement was affirmed; full terms reproduced on the record
Terms assent interactionThe opened / displayed-to-end / agreed timestamps and what was observed (§5)
Phone-possession verificationSMS one-time passcode result, masked number, and its stated limits (§3)
Signed (server time)Hereby server time recorded when signing was completed
Signer IP addressThe network IP address observed by Hereby at signing
Device / browserThe browser/OS reported by the signer’s software
ReferenceThe unique transaction reference
Agreement versionThe version identifier of the terms signed
Agreement text (SHA-256)The canonical fingerprint of the exact terms reproduced above (§4)
Terms as displayedThe disclosure-integrity result — “Verified” only on a real hash match
Record hash (SHA-256)Fingerprint of the submitted data; any change to the data changes it

The certificate is internally consistent: the version identifier, the text hash, the “Terms as displayed” result, and the reproduced agreement text all refer to the same thing. No line asserts something another line contradicts.

§7Data custody and privacy

Hereby follows a data-minimization model — keep the evidence, not the paperwork. Two things should be distinguished:

This design reduces the amount of completed-document content Hereby retains and limits exposure if retained systems are compromised. It does not eliminate all privacy or security risks during transmission and processing.

§8Tamper-evidence and independent verification

Two independent integrity mechanisms are applied to every signed document. The document fingerprint (§8.2) is the primary file-matching check used by Hereby. The embedded cryptographic seal (§8.1) is a second, in-file mechanism.

8.1Cryptographic seal (PAdES-compatible)

The final PDF is digitally sealed using a PAdES-compatible PDF signature and carries an RFC-3161 timestamp from an independent third-party Time Stamp Authority, providing independently verifiable evidence of the signing time. Opening the PDF in a reader such as Adobe Acrobat shows a signature in the Signatures panel. What a reviewer sees depends on the reader’s version, trust settings, and network access, but typically:

What a PDF reader typically shows on a Hereby seal
  • The reader reports whether the document has been modified since the signature was applied — the integrity check the seal provides.
  • The signature carries an RFC-3161 timestamp from an independent third-party Time Stamp Authority, giving independently verifiable evidence of signing time rather than relying on the signer’s own computer clock.
  • !A certificate-trust warning may appear if the reader cannot build a trusted chain to Hereby’s signing certificate. That warning is not, by itself, proof that the signed bytes were modified. Using a certificate whose trust chain is recognized by the reader, such as an appropriate AATL-backed certificate, would ordinarily remove that issuer-trust warning.

A certificate-trust warning reflects how a reader evaluates the issuer — a separate question from whether the signed bytes changed. The primary file-matching check is §8.2.

8.2Document fingerprint (SHA-256)

At the moment of signing, Hereby records the SHA-256 hash of the exact delivered PDF. Anyone can later confirm that a file matches the exact PDF Hereby recorded at signing by re-hashing it and comparing.

The public verifier

Anyone — a counterparty, an auditor, or a court — can check a document at herebysign.com/verify, with no account. Drop the PDF onto the page; the file is hashed in your own browser, so only the 64-character fingerprint is sent to Hereby and the document itself is never uploaded. Hereby reports whether that fingerprint matches the file it recorded at signing, and if so shows the signing facts. Every certificate prints the verification address, so a signed document carries its own instructions for being checked. Verification is available while the corresponding evidence record remains within Hereby’s retention period and the verification service is operational (§9).

The fingerprint rejects any change

The fingerprint is exact. An unaltered, originally-delivered file matches; after even a trivial modification — highlighting text and undoing it, then re-saving the file — the modified copy no longer matches (saving rewrites the file’s internal structure, changing the fingerprint). There is no such thing as a “harmless” edit.

8.3Certificate legal notice

Hereby’s signing certificate carries an embedded legal notice (visible in Acrobat under Signature Properties → Show Signer’s Certificate → Legal Notice) stating, in the certificate itself, that this is a private certification seal, that signer verification is by SMS one-time passcode rather than government ID, and where to independently check a document.

§9Important caveats

Ex.A sample signed certificate

A representative completed signing. Its delivered PDF matches the file Hereby recorded at signing and carries the seal, independently verifiable timestamp, and legal notice described above.

Sample · Certificate on file
Signer
Frankie Vito · Owner · Vito’s Pizza
Phone-possession verification
SMS one-time passcode · +1 (•••) •••-5554
Terms as displayed
Verified — client-reported hash matched the canonical disclosure on file
Signed (Hereby server time)
Jul 26, 2026 at 12:10 AM ET
Network IP observed
98.28.99.168
Document hash (SHA-256)
15ac73ed50acabe6e6b540a4712c0da498b1e46653eb4b803da044817f4adf70

Every statement on this page is meant to be checkable against a signed certificate. Confirm that a file matches the exact PDF Hereby recorded at signing at herebysign.com/verify.